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COMMENTS
THE WASHINGTON AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE
The ordinary rules of negligence, applied in actions brought by
a guest against his host for injuries suffered in an automobile
accident, bring about results which are rather generally thought to
be unsatisfactory. On the basis either of fairness,' that the guest
is an ingrate if, willing to accept the accommodation of the ride,
he is unwilling to take his chances with his host, or policy,2 stemming from the more or less collusive nature of many such actions

'See, for example, Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 293 Pac. 841
(1930) where it was said: "The proverbial ingratitude of the dog which
bites the hand that feeds him finds counterpart in the many cases that
arose where generous drivers . . . later found themselves defendants.
Undoubtedly the legislature in adopting this act reflected a certain natural
feeling as to the injustices of this situation." And compare Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267 (1926); O'Shea v. Lavoy, 175 Wis. 456,
185 N. W. 525 (1921).
2See Walker v. Adamson, 62 P. (2d)
199 (Cal. 1936): "The purpose of
the guest statute is to rid the courts of litigation arising out of auto
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in which the theoretical adversaries cooperate in a friendly fashion
to shift the burden to the insurance carrier, there has been a
strong trend toward restriction upon recovery in a majority of the
states, either by statute or by decision.- In Washington the limiting
device employed by the court was the requirement that gross negligence be shown for recovery, 4 the rather unhappy history of this
method coming to an end when the legislature assumed control
over the situation by the enactment of Ch. 18, Laws of 1933:'
"See. 1: No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as an invited guest or licensee without payment for such transportation shall have a cause
of action for damages against such owner or operator for
injuries, death, or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have been intentional on the part of said
owner or operator."
Aside from the minor matter of the draughtsman's curious
choice of words, by which "accident" and " intentional" are linked
to create the paradox of an intended unforseen event, 6 the statute
raises two problems :7 (1) what proof will sufficiently show intenaccidents in which close relatives and associates sue others and engage
in what in reality is a collusive suit for the ultimate spoilation of the
Insurer." In Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 154, 53 P. (2d) 615 (1936) it is
said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that, since 1926,when the gross
negligence rule was first applied to host and guest cases, litigation arising out of such relations, where automobiles were involved, has steadily
increased. It is also a matter of common knowledge that many owners and
operators of automobiles' carry liability insurance, and that, in many
instances, the injured guest institutes an action against the host for
the purpose of recovering damages from the insurance company. It has
been asserted that collusion frequently takes place -between host and
guest . . ."

'Ala. Code (1936) § 1397 (224); Ark. Acts. (1935) § 179; Cal. Gen.
Laws (Deering 1931) Art. 5128 § 141%; Colo. Comp. Laws (1932) §
1384.22; Conn. Gen. St. (1930) § 1628; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 5713;
Idaho Ann. Code (1932) §§ 48-901, 48-902; I. Rev. St. (1935) c. 95a §
47-5; Ind. Ann. St. (Burns, 1933) §§ 47-1021, 47-1022; Iowa Code (1935)
c. 251 § 5026-bl; Kans. Laws (1931 Supp.) c. 81; Ken. St. (Baldwin 1936)
§ 12-7; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 4648; Mont. Rev. Codes (1935) §§
1748.1-1748.4; Neb. Laws (1935) § 39-1129; Nev. Laws (1933) c. 34; N. M.
Laws (1935) c. 15; N. D. Laws (1931) c. 184, p. 310; Ohio Gen. Code §
6308-6; Ore. Code (1930) § 55-1209, 1210; S. C. Code (1932) § 5908; S. D.
Laws (1933) c. 147, p. 154; Tex. Ann. Civ. St. (Vernon 1936 Supp.) §
6701b p. 504; Utah Laws (1935) c. 52; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 5113; Wyo.
Rev. St. (1931) § 72-701. Liability under these acts is based upon units
or combinations of heedless disregard, intentional act, heedlessness, wilful misconduct, gross negligence, or intoxication.
'See Craig v. McAtee, 160 Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 131 (1931); Shea v.
Olson, supra, note 2, and authorities there cited; 2 WAsH. L. REv. 197; 5
WASH. L. REV. 91; 7 WASH. L. REV. 337.
5REm. REv. STAT. § 6297-1. Sec. 2 of the act, excepting owners or operators of cars being demonstrated to prospective purchasers, Is not quoted.
,The confusion arises because of the use of the word "accident" in the
lay sense, as meaning "wreck"; such usage of the word is recognized
in Shea v. Olson, supra,note 2.
'The problem of constitutionality' is not treated in this comment;
an'excellent discussion is found in Shea v. Olson, mpra, note 2.
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tion to permit recovery under the statute, and (2) what circumstances will bring the plaintiff within or without the status of
transporta"invited guest or licensee without payment for .
tion."
The first question is answered by the three 9 cases which have
been decided under the statute. In Shea v. Olson it was urged that
it was for the jury to say whether or not it was defendant's intention to injure plaintiff, and that where the omission to exercise
care is so gross that it shows an utter disregard for the safety of
others, it will justify a finding of intention to accomplish the
result, 10 a rule with which the court does not quarrel. But that, the
opinion goes on to say, is not the question here; we are not concerned whether wilful or wanton misconduct may be held to be
"intentional", "but whether the legislature, when it used the
words 'unless such accident shall have been intentional on the
part of the owner or operator', meant anything other than that the
owner or operator must have purposely brought about the
'accident' ".11 That it did mean exactly that the court feels is plain
from the fact that the statute is obviously an attempt "to limit
still further the liability" of the host to his guest "by withdrawing
the question of negligence altogether and limiting the liability to
cases where the owner or operator purposely caused a wreck or disaster."' 2 Applying this construction to the case in question, since
"there was no evidence of any intention on the part of defendant
to commit suicide, homicide, or mayhem, or to destroy property, we
conclude that there was no basis for holding defendant liable as
for an 'intentional accident' ".13

As a decision on the impropriety of an inference of intent from
'
the facts of the particular case, this is perfectly satisfactory;
as a repudiation of the fiction whereby courts escape the consequences of contributory negligence or a lack of duty to use ordinary care by imputing to the defendant a purposeful state of mind
from facts indicating simply recklessness, it is admirable; but if it
means that the jury may never, from the character of the defendant's conduct, properly infer an intent to bring about a
wreck, then the legislature's attempt "to limit still further the
8In order of decision, these are: Shea v. Olson, supra, note 2 (Jan.,
1936); Carufel v. Davis, 88 Wash. Dec. 112, 61 P. (2d) 1005 (Oct., 1936);
Lassiter v. Shell Oil Company, 88 Wash. Dec. 299, 62 P. (2d) 1096 (Dec.,
1936).
'The page citations following are to the report of the case in 185
Wash. 143.
"°At page 149.
"P. 150.
12P. 150.
"ap. 151.
"Plaintiff was defendant's partner in a party of ton who drove in two
cars to a roadhouse 'near Yakima for a dance. Arriving there, it was
found to be crowded; and the party decided to go somewhere else; the
other car left first, and defendant, who had been drinking, in an attempt

to overtake the others drove 60 miles an hour at night on a dusty gravel
over

road with five people in his coupe, did not see a curve, and went
the bank. Recklessness and gross negligence Is clear, but as the court
points out there is nothing from which an intent to drive over the bank
may be inferred.
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liability of owners and operators of motor vehicles to invited guests"
has borne strong fruit indeed. Short of a declaration of intent by
the driver, the guest's action must necessarily fail, and the difficulty of proving "an intention . . . to commit suicide, homicide,
mayhem, or to destroy property" is multiplied a hundredfold by
depriving the plaintiff of his usual evidence. This result is so
extreme and unreasonable it seems probable that the holding should
be interpreted to mean no more than this: (1) only intentional injury is actionable, (2) plaintiff must prove this intent specifically,
in the sense but not to the degree required in cases of suicide, homicide, or mayhem, and (3) this burden is not sustained merely by
showing recklessness, heedlessness, or gross negligence, since the
jury cannot reasonably infer the necessary intent to injure-the
"purpose to do something" as opposed to "indifference whether
something is done or not'"--from these alone.
The answer to the second question presents difficulties which
only time and a series of decisions can determine. The three cases
to which the statute has already been applied offer slight clues
to its solution, since in none of them could the issue be seriously
contested.'" It is clear that the hiring of the vehicle, or its use to
further the business purposes of the owner or operator 6 are not
within the statute; it is clear that a purely social ride is within
it; but the infinite factual variations between these two extremes
will present knotty problems to the court. The wording of the statute
itself is of comparatively little help. One point has been established
by the ease of Forman v. Shields, 7 though it would seem, in any
event, explicit in the statute: the provision does not affect the
liability of owner or operator of the automobile to any one standing
in any other relationship than that of "invited guest or licensee
without payment for . . . transportation." This means, as applied
in the Pto man case, that a joint adventurer does not come within
its terms, which is consistent with the earlier holdings of the court
dealing with the gross negligence formula. 18 In this connection it
is probable that the nebulous concept of joint adventure will need
5

'1In the Shea case, as already indicated -the parties were on a purely
social expedition, paid for, so far as operation expenses are concerned,
by defendant; in Carufel v. Davis, supra, note 8, plaintiff and family were
invited by defendant and family to accompany them to a bathing beach
near Spokane; and In Lassiter v. Shell Oil Company, stpra, note 8, the
driver, buying beer in Wenatchee, was overheard by plaintiff's decedent
saying that he was going to Ellensburg; on the suggestion that decedent
would like to ride along and visit his wife, the invitation followed. The
court points out that "there is not a scintilla of evidence" (p. 800, Wash.
Dec.) that this was other than a purely social invitation.
"Sec. 2 of the statute expressly excepts owners or operators demonstrating cars to prospective purchasers, a result which would seem to
follow without explicit provision in the light of the holding in Dahl v.
Moore, 161 Wash. 503, 297 Pac. 218 (1931), wherein the court refused
to apply the gross negligence formula to a plaintiff while being carried
in defendant's car to see a piece of real estate defendant proposed to sell;
stress is laid on the fact that wherever the transportation is for the
business benefit of the operator, the occupant, whatever else he may be,

is not a guest.

1183 Wash. 333, 48 P. (2d) 599 (1935).
"See, for example, O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 Pac. 304
(1928); Lloyd v. Mowery, 158 Wash. 341, 290 Pac. 710 (1930).
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modification in order to effectuate the purpose of the statute, for
it is difficult to see wherein the purely social joint adventure,"
whether or not involving the sharing of expenses arranged in advance,20 avoids the evils recognized by court and legislature as
calling for the enactment of the guest statute. Neither the shocking ingratitude of the guest nor the dangers of collusive action to
fleece the insurance carrier can be avoided with any success unless
much stricter limits are placed upon the doctrine than the Washington court now recognizes. The minimum requirement would
seem to be a business advantage to at least the host in the transportation resulting in the injury; to permit a recovery on the
basis of joint adventure taking the plaintiff out of the guest status
where the friend, picnic bound, agree each to buy a gallon of gasoline,2 1 or, on a goose shooting expedition, jointly to contribute to
expenses, 22 is to emasculate the statute and defeat what can only
be found to be the declared intention of the legislature.
A similar danger lies in the possibilities of the phrase "payment
for such transportation". The term "payment" should not, of
course, be limited merely to the delivery of money; rather, it
should be construed to mean "compensation", which is the word
used in the California and North Dakota acts.2 3 But not any "compensation" should be enough to constitute the "payment" of the
statute; certainly "reciprocal generosities" consisting of the pur24
chase of gasoline, oil, meals, or accommodations should not do so,
and incidental services such as helping to change a tire or giving
road directions 25 should not be enough. Nor should the fact that
"As in Lloyd v. Mowery, supra note 18 (hunting trip); O'Drien v.
Woldson, supra note 18 (pleasure trip to Seattle from Spokane); Forman
v. Shields, sulna note 17 (senior class picnic).
-The court has said that the relation must originate in contract
(Rosenstrom v. North Bend Stage Lines, 154 Wash. 57, 280 Pac. 932
(1929)), a requirement which is most conveniently shown by an arrangement in advance concerning expenses. But such an arrangement is not
necessarily decisive, as the court points out in Eubanks v. Kielsmeier,
171 Wash. 484, 18 P. (2d) 48 (1933), since it may be "simply an expression of courtesy and appreciation that a guest often evinces and
manifests" (p. 487). Possibly the weight to be attached to this statement in the Eubanks case is lessened by the importance seemingly given
to the absence of such an arrangement as indicative of the guest status in
the Lassiter case, supra note 8, but it would seem clear that in any event
the sharing of expenses should not alone serve to take the purely social
undertaking into the class of joint adventure.
"1As in Forman v. Shields, supra note 17. It is interesting to note that
the agreement was never carried out, a circumstance commented on in
the 2Eubanks case, supra note 20, in finding no joint adventure.
' As in Lloyd v. Mowery, supra note 18. The parties, "friends of long
standing", were accustomed to hunt together each season; can it be
plausibly argued that the danger of a collusive suit is avoided because
the expeditions were on the basis of "Dutch treat"?
3Supra note 3.
"1See the court's statement in Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, supra note 20;
McCann v. Hoffman, 62 P. (2d) 401 (Cal. App., 1936); Ernest v. Bellville,
53 Ohio App. 110, 4 N. E. (2d) 286 (1936); Olefsky v. Ludwig, 242 App.
Div. 637, 272 N. Y. Supp. 158 (1934); 95 A. L. R. 1180.
"As in Gruber v. Cater Transfer Company, 96 Wash. 544, 165 Pac. 491
(1917), where plaintiff went along to give directions. But see Lerma v.
Flores, 60 P. (2d) 546 (Cal. App., 1936), where it was held that plaintiff
was not a guest because he gave directions as to route in order to avoid

COMMENTS

143.

such matters are offered or agreed upon in advance necessarily be
decisive. 26 What is to be looked for is "compensation to the operator or owner in a business sense by the occupant's presence, and
the fact that the carriage was undertaken by reason of that compensation", 27 given either by the occupant or in his behalf. Only
thus may the danger of collusion be lessened; short of this the occupant is still a "guest" insofar as that word has real significance
in the working of the legislative purpose.
Other types of problems suggest themselves. One example will
suffice: under the gross negligence rule it is held that the infant
child, "who has no option other than to accompany her mother",
is not a guest. 28 But what will be decisive of the matter when the
"option" formula will not serve? The plaintiffs in both the Se 9
and FormaW.° cases were infants, though in neither was that fact
mentioned as being significant in determining their status. Presumably some capacity is necessary in order to become a guest ;38
shall it be similar to the capacity to contract, to commit a crime,
to be negligent? Preferably no arbitrary rule as to age should be
adopted, but some quantitative measurement of the necessary understanding must be evolved.
Such questions may be multiplied to limits set only by ingenuity or industry. But it must be realized that upon their decision
hinges the success or failure of the statute. The court has begun
its task of application reasonably, carefully, and courageously; if
it brings to later cases similar traits in equal measure, the legislative policy expressed in the guest statute will be fulfilled.
J. W. RiclEARDS,
L N L. WOLFSTONE.

traffic. If the occasion for transporting the occupant is the use of his
information, the holding is probably correct; if -the purpose is social,
the information incidental to the ride, it seems improper.
"See comment in note 20 supra.
"Weber, "Guest Statutes" (1937) 11 Univ. or C=m. L. REV. 24, 40.
'Hart v. Rogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24 P. (2d) 99 (1933); the child was
12 years old. The basis for the holding is -the involuntary nature of the
occupancy. Kastel v. Stleber, 215 Cal. 37, 297 Pac. 932 (1931). Hence it
has been held that a guest achieves the "no guest" status by a request
to leave the vehicle: Blanchard v. Ogletree, 41 Ga. App. 4, 152 S. El.
116 (1930).

"Supra note 2.
*Supra note 17.
"Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 245, 44 P. (2d) 478 (1935); contains dictum to the effect that a five-year-old child has no capacity, to
"accept" a ride in a legal sense; held, that the guest statute did not

apply.

